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Abstract
This paper assumes the standard optimal income tax model of Mirrlees (Review of Economic
Studies, 1971). It gives fairly mild conditions under which the optimal nonlinear labor income tax
profile derived under maximin has higher marginal tax rates than the ones derived with welfarist
criteria that sum over the population any concave transformation of individual utilities. This strict
dominance result is always valid close to the bounds of the skill distribution and almost everywhere
(except at the upper bound) when quasilinear-in-consumption preferences are assumed.
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1 Introduction
Choné and Laroque (2005) and Laroque (2005) show that in the optimal labor income tax model
where labor supply responses are modeled along the extensive margin, the Rawlsian criterion (which
maximizes the income tax revenue) gives a benchmark, the Laﬀer bound. Any optimal allocation
corresponds to tax schedules which are below that benchmark. This paper gives a comparable
result when dealing with the intensive margin. In the optimal (nonlinear) labor income tax model
where labor supply responses are modeled along the intensive margin, the maximin solution gives
also an upper bound.1 Assuming an isoelastic disutility of labor and quasilinear-in consumption
preferences, the optimal marginal tax schedule under maximin is a benchmark above which it is
suboptimal to tax under the integral over the population of any concave function of individual
utilities. Assuming a general separable utility function, this result is still valid close to the bottom
and the top of the skill distribution.
2 The Model
We use the model that has been employed in much of the literature on optimal labor income
taxation since the seminal article of Mirrlees (1971). We assume that all households have the same
utility function and an additively separable form as in Mirrlees (1971) and Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1980):
u(x, `) = v(x)− h(`) (1)
where x is consumption and ` is labor (so 1 − ` is leisure), with v0 > 0 ≥ v00, h0 > 0 and h00 ≥ 0,
with either v00 < 0 or h00 > 0.
Households diﬀer only in skills, which correspond with their wage rates given that aggregate
production is linear in labor. Skills w are distributed according to the function F (w) for w ∈W =
[w,w], where 0 < w < w <∞. The density function, f(w) = F 0(w), is assumed to be diﬀerentiable
and strictly positive for all w ∈W .
Households obtain their income from wages, with income denoted by y ≡ w`. Let x(w), `(w)
and y (w) be consumption, labor supply and income for a household with skill w. The government
can observe incomes but not wage rates or labor supplied, so it bases its tax scheme on income.
Then, the budget constraint for household w is:
x(w) = y(w)− T (y(w)) (2)
1Assuming a linear income tax, Atkinson (1983) numerically shows that the optimal tax rate is always larger
under Maximin.
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where T (y (w)) is the tax imposed on type-w households. The household maximizes (1) subject
to (2), yielding the first-order condition:
h0(`(w))
wv0(x(w))
= 1− T 0(y(w)) (3)
If we use ` = y/w to rewrite the utility function as v(x)− h(y/w), the left-hand side of (3) can be
interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution between income y and consumption x.
We will compare the optimal tax schedules derived under a maximin criterion and a welfarist
criterion that sums over all individuals a transformation Φ of individuals’ utility with Φ0 > 0 and
Φ00 ≤ 0 (hence the government has a non-negative aversion to inequality) and Φ independent of
w. Under maximin, the government maximizes the welfare of the least well-oﬀ households. Given
our information assumptions, the worst-oﬀ will be those with wage w at the bottom of the skill
distribution hence the maximin criterion is
u(w) (4)
The welfarist social preferences are Z w
w
Φ(u(w))dw (5)
The government chooses the tax schedule T (y (w)) or, equivalently, the consumption-income
bundle intended for each household {(x(w), y(w), w ∈W}, to maximize its social welfare function,
subject to two sorts of constraints.
The first is the government budget constraint, which takes the form:Z w
w
[y(w)− x(w)]f(w)dw ≥ R (6)
where R is an exogenous revenue requirement. This constraint must be binding at the optimum
since u is increasing in x.
The second is the set of incentive-compatibility constraints, which require that type-w house-
holds choose the consumption-income bundle intended for them, that is,
v (x (w))− h
µ
y(w)
w
¶
≥ v (x ( bw))− hµy( bw)
w
¶
∀w, bw ∈W (7)
As Mirrlees (1971) shows, the necessary conditions for (7) to be satisfied are:
.
u(w) = h0(.)
y(w)
w2
= h0(.)
`(w)
w
∀w (8)
where, using (1), u (w) ≡ v(x (w))− h(` (w)).2
2These so-called first-order incentive compatibility conditions (FOIC) may not be suﬃcient. Suﬃciency is guar-
anteed by the second-order incentive compatibility (SOIC) conditions,
.
y(w) ≥ 0 (or equivalently .x(w) ≥ 0) (Ebert
(1992)). If the SOIC constraints are slack (
.
y(w) > 0), the first-order approach is appropriate. Where they are
binding, we have
.
x(w) =
.
y(w) = 0, so there is bunching of households of diﬀerent skills.
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The problem for the government is to choose x (w), ` (w) and u (w) to maximize its welfare
function subject to the budget constraint (6) and the FOIC conditions (8), where x (w) and ` (w)
are controls and u (w) is a state variable. However, since u (w) = v(x (w)) − h(` (w)) by (1), we
can treat x (w) as an implicit function of u (w) and ` (w) and write it with some abuse of notation
as x (u (w) , ` (w)), where by diﬀerentiating (1), we obtain:
∂x(u(w), `(w))
∂`
=
h0(` (w))
v0(x (w))
,
∂x(u(w), `(w))
∂u
=
1
v0(x (w))
(9)
We can then suppress x(w) from the government problem and write it as follows:
Max
{u(w),`(w)}
W (u(w)) s.t.
Z w
w
[w`(w)− x(u(w), `(w))]f(w)dw = R, .u(w) = `(w)h
0(`(w))
w
(10)
where the social welfare function W (u(w)) represents either (4) or (5).
The corresponding Lagrangian is:
$ ≡W (u(w)) + λ
Z w
w
·
[w`(w)− x(u(w), `(w))]f(w)− R
w − w
¸
dw
+
Z w
w
ζ(w)
·
`(w)h0(`(w))
w
− .u(w)
¸
dw (11)
where λ is the multiplier associated with the binding budget constraint (6) and ζ(w) is the multiplier
associated with the FOIC conditions (8). The necessary conditions are given in Appendix. Under
maximin, the first-order conditions reduce to the following:
T 0M (y(w))
1− T 0M (y(w))
= A(w)
1
wf(w)
v0(xM (w))
Z w
w
f (t)
v0 (xM (t))
dt ∀w ∈W (12)
where the subscript M states for maximin and where
A(w) = 1 +
h00(`(w))`(w)
h0(`(w))
is a measure of the elasticity of labor supply.3
Under the social welfare function (5), the marginal tax rate denoted by T 0Φ(y(w)) can be ex-
pressed as:4
T 0Φ(y(w))
1− T 0Φ(y(w))
= A(w)
1
wf(w)
v0(xΦ(w))
Z w
w
µ
1
v0 (xΦ (t))
− Φ
0 (u(t))
λΦ
¶
f(t)dt ∀w ∈W (14)
where the subscript Φ states for the social objective
R w
w
Φ(u(w))dw.
3The term A (w) ≡ [1+ `h00(`)/h0(`)] is equal to [1+ eu(wn)]/ec(wn) where ec(wn) and eu(wn) are the compen-
sated and uncompensated elasticities of labor supply, respectively. More precisely, using (3), ec(wn) and eu(wn)
satisfy
ec(wn) =
h0(`)
(h00(`)−w2nv00(x)) `
> 0 and eu(wn) =
h0(`) + v00(x)w2n`
(h00(`)− w2nv00(x))`
where wn ≡ w(1− T 0(y(w))) is the after-tax wage rate (Saez, 2001).
4This writing is similar to the optimal tax formula in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).
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Our analysis has been conducted as if the first-order approach is valid. This will be the case as
long as (12) and (14) yield solutions for T 0(y(w)) such that y(w) (or x(w)) is everywhere increasing
in w. For simplicity, we assume it satisfied.5
Assume, following Diamond (1998), that h(`) takes the isoelastic form so A(w) is constant.
In order to show that the marginal tax rate under maximin is always above or equal to the one
under the more general social welfare function, we have to show that T 0M (y(w))/ (1− T 0M (y(w)))−
T 0Φ(y(w))/ (1− T 0Φ(y(w))) ≥ 0 ∀w since it is well established that 0 ≤ T 0(y(w)) < 1 (Seade, 1977,
1982). Since A(w) and wf(w) do not depend on the objective function, this reduces to show that
Ω(w) ≡ v0(xM (w))
Z w
w
f(t)
v0(xM (t))
dt− v0(xΦ(w))
Z w
w
µ
1
v0(xΦ(t))
− Φ
0 (u(t))
λ
¶
f(t)dt ≥ 0 ∀w
(15)
First, consider Ω(w) at w = w. From (23) (in the Appendix) and the transversality condition
ζΦ(w) = 0, we have:
Ω(w) = v0(xM (w))
Z w
w
f(t)
v0(xM (t))
dt
From (27) (in the Appendix) and the transversality condition ζM (w) = −1, the latter expression
becomes:
Ω(w) = v
0(xM (w))
λM
> 0 (16)
Second, putting w = w in (15) gives:
Ω(w) = 0 (17)
Equation (16) relies on the sharp contrast between the optimal marginal tax rate at the bottom
under maximin and under a more general social welfare function. Assuming no bunching at the
bottom, T 0Φ(y(w)) = 0 under the more general welfarist criterion (Seade, 1977). Contrastingly,
T 0M (y(w)) > 0 under maximin. Intuitively, increasing the marginal tax rate at a skill level ew distorts
the labor supply of those with skill ew, implying an eﬃciency loss. However, it also improves equity
when the extra tax revenue can be redistributed towards a positive mass of agents with skills
w ≤ ew. As long as the latter outweighs the former in the welfare criterion, such transfers are
positively valued, hence an equity gain appears. Under social preferences
R w
w
Φ(u(w))dw, the mass
of people at the bottom of the skill distribution is zero hence a positive marginal tax rate would
not improve equity but would create an eﬃciency loss. Even when the aversion to inequality
approaches infinity in the social welfare function, the marginal tax rate continues to be zero at the
5Boadway and Jacquet (2008) show that a non-increasing marginal tax rate is suﬃcient to satisfy the SOIC
conditions and that the marginal tax rate is decreasing under maximin, under fairly mild conditions.
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bottom (Boadway and Jacquet, 2008).6 Contrastingly, under maximin, everyone in the objective
function is at w = w, so the equity eﬀect is positive hence T 0M (y(w)) > 0. Moreover, as well
known since Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977), the optimal marginal tax rate at the top is zero with
a bounded skill distribution, i.e. T 0M (y(w)) = T
0
Φ(y(w)) = 0, which yields (17). These results can
be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1 At the bottom (top) of the skill distribution, the optimal marginal tax rate under
maximin is larger (equal) to the one under criterion
R w
w
Φ(u(w))dw.
From (16) and (17), deriving conditions under which Ω(w) is monotonically decreasing in w on
(w,w) implies (15). In other words, Ω(w) monotonically decreasing in w on (w,w) ensures that
the optimal marginal tax rates under maximin are larger than the ones under the general social
welfare function. We diﬀerentiate (15):
Ω0(w) = v00(xM (w))
.
xM (w)
Z w
w
f(t)
v0(xM (t))
dt (18)
−v00(xΦ(w))
.
xΦ(w)
Z w
w
µ
1
v0(xΦ(t))
− Φ
0 (u(t))
λΦ
¶
f(t)dt− v0(xΦ(w))
Φ0 (u(w))
λΦ
f(w)
Proposition 2 With quasilinear-in-consumption preferences and when h(`) takes the isoelastic
form, the marginal tax rate T 0M (y(w)) derived under maximin is always larger than that under the
general social welfare function
R w
w
Φ(u(w))dw, ∀w ∈ (w,w).
Proof. Substituting v0(x) = 1 and v00(x) = 0 into (18), we obtain:
Ω0(w) = −Φ
0 (u(w))
λΦ
f(w) < 0
This completes the proof that Ω(w) is monotonically decreasing in w under quasilinear-in-consumption
preferences.
Proposition 3 With separable utility, close to the bottom and the top of the skill distribution,
the marginal tax rate T 0M (y(w)) derived under maximin is always larger than that under criterionR w
w
Φ(u(w))dw.
Proof. Evaluating (18) at w = w, using (21), (23), (25) and (27) (in the Appendix) yields:
Ω0(w) = v
00(xM (w))
.
xM (w)
λM
− v0(xΦ(w))
Φ0 (u(w))
λΦ
f(w) < 0
6 It is worth noting that a discrete support for the skill distribution, hence social preferences written asPw
w Φ(u(w))dw, is a suﬃcient condition for having a strictly positive marginal tax rate at the bottom. Intu-
itively, the mass of people at the bottom of the skill distribution is then strictly positive hence a positive marginal
tax rate at w = w improves equity.
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From (18), when w = w, we have:
Ω0(w) = −v
0(xΦ(w))Φ(u(w))f(w)
λΦ
< 0
Therefore, since Equation (17) states that Ω(w) = 0 and Equation (16) states Ω(w) > 0 we
can conclude that Ω(w) is monotonically decreasing in w close to w and w, with general additively
separable preferences.
3 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to provide conditions under which maximin entails higher
optimal marginal tax rates than other social preferences. Assuming quasilinear-in-consumption
preferences and an isoelastic disutility of labor, the optimal marginal tax rates under maximin
give an upper bound to the ones we would obtain under welfarist criteria that integrate over
the population any concave transformation of individual utilities. With additive preferences, this
dominance result is also valid close to the bounds of the skill distribution.
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Appendix: First-order conditions
This appendix gives the necessary conditions of (10) under the welfarist objective function (5) and
the ones under maximin (4).
Integrating by parts to obtain
R w
w
ζ(w)
.
u(w)dw = ζ(w)u(w)− ζ(w)u(w)−
R w
w
.
ζ(w)u(w)dw, the
Lagrangian (11) becomes
$ ≡W (u(w)) + λ
Z w
w
·
[w`(w)− x(u(w), `(w))]f(w)− R
w − w
¸
dw
+ ζ(w)u(w)− ζ(w)u(w) +
Z w
w
·
ζ(w)
`(w)h0(`(w))
w
+
.
ζ(w)u(w)
¸
dw
The rest of this section simplifies the mathematical writing by using the same notation for
variables at the optimum under both objective functions. However, in the equations we need
for a later demonstration, we add subscripts Φ or M for social preferences (5) and for maximin,
respectively. Under (5), the necessary conditions (assuming an interior solution) are:7
∂$
∂`(w)
= λ
·
w − h
0(`(w))
v0(x(w))
¸
f(w) +
ζ(w)h0(`(w))
w
µ
1 +
`(w)h00(`(w))
h0(`(w))
¶
= 0 ∀w ∈W (19)
∂$
∂u(w)
= Φ0 (u(w)) f(w)− λf(w)
v0(x(w))
+
.
ζ(w) = 0 ∀w ∈ (w,w) (20)
∂$
∂u(w)
= ζΦ(w) = 0 (21)
∂$
∂u(w)
= ζΦ(w) = 0 (22)
Integrating
.
ζ(w) in (20) and using the transversality condition ζΦ(w) = 0, we obtain:
−ζΦ(w)
λΦ
=
Z w
w
µ
1
v0(xΦ(t))
− Φ
0 (u(t))
λΦ
¶
f(t)dt > 0 (23)
Using (3), (19) may be rewritten as:
T 0Φ(y(w))
1− T 0Φ(y(w))
= −ζΦ(w)v
0 (x(w))
λwf(w)
µ
1 +
`(w)h00(`(w))
h0(`(w))
¶
∀w ∈W (24)
Finally, combining (23) and (24), the first-order conditions characterizing the optimal marginal
tax rates under (5) can be written as (14).
Under maximin, we have the necessary condition (20) and also:
∂$
∂u(w)
= − λf(w)
v0(x(w))
+
.
ζM (w) = 0 ∀w ∈ (w,w)
∂$
∂u(w)
= 1 + ζM (w) = 0 (25)
∂$
∂u(w)
= ζM (w) = 0 (26)
Integrating
.
ζ(w) in (20) and using the transversality condition ζM (w) = 0, we obtain:
−ζM (w)
λ
=
Z w
w
f(t)
v0(xM (t))
dt (27)
7When we diﬀerentiate the Lagrangian, we must do so with respect to the end-points as well as the interior
points, which gives the transversality conditions. These necessary conditions can also be derived based on varia-
tional techniques using Pontryagin’s principle (Pontryagin, 1964). As is usual, we assume that x (w) and ` (w) are
continuous throughout and, in the absence of bunching, diﬀerentiable.
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Using (3), (19) may be rewritten as:
T 0M (y(w))
1− T 0M (y(w))
= −ζM (w)v
0 (x(w))
λwf(w)
µ
1 +
`(w)h00(`(w))
h0(`(w))
¶
∀w ∈W (28)
Finally, combining (27) and (28), the first-order conditions characterizing the optimal marginal
tax rates can be written as (12).
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